17 ideas
| 6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
| 16730 | If matter is entirely atoms, anything else we notice in it can only be modes [Gassendi] |
| 16619 | We observe qualities, and use 'induction' to refer to the substances lying under them [Gassendi] |
| 9264 | Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9266 | A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt] |
| 9267 | Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt] |
| 9265 | The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt] |
| 20015 | Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 9270 | A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt] |
| 9269 | A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt] |
| 6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
| 6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
| 6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| 16593 | Atoms are not points, but hard indivisible things, which no force in nature can divide [Gassendi] |
| 16729 | How do mere atoms produce qualities like colour, flavour and odour? [Gassendi] |
| 6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
| 6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |